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JOSEPH CAPITAIN, Respondent, v. L. A. WRECKING 
COMPANY et al., Appellants. 
[1] Sales-Passage of Title-Risk of Loss.-Generally risk of loss 
falls on the seller if title has not passed, and on the buyer 
if it has. (Civ. Code,§§ 1738,1739, 1742.) 
[2] !d.-Passage of Title-Risk of Loss.-Seller suffers the loss 
resulting from burning of a house after it had been moved 
to the buyer's property, pursuant to a contract for its sale 
and delivery, but while it still rested on the mover's blocks, 
and before part of the roof, which had been temporarily 
removed, had been restored, where an intent that delivery 
was not to be completed until the house was on the foundation 
is evidenced by a notation, on the contract, authorized by the 
seller calling for payment of a balance when the house was 
on the foundation, and where the purchase contemplated a 
complete unit with a roof. (Civ. Code § 1739(5).) 
[3] !d.-Passage of Title-Intention of Parties.-Since a contract 
for sale and delivery of a house gives the buyer an insurable 
interest therein he is entitled to insure it for the protection 
of one loaning him money for the purchase regardless of who 
has title, and his agreement to do so is not conclusive as 
showing an intent that title pass before the house is moved. 
[4] !d.-Passage of Title-Payment.-Under a contract for sale 
and delivery of a house naming a figure as the "full price" 
of the house, but stating the sale to be subject to the additional 
cost of moving, and specifying a maximum total delivered 
price, payment, before the house is moved, of the sum de-
scribed as "the full price" of the house does not conclusively 
establish that title was then to pass, in view of the balance 
which, while it might be allocated to the moving expense, is 
still part of the maximum which the buyer promised to pay. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Ralph McGee, Judge.* Affirmed. 
Action for damages for building destroyed by fire. Judg-
ment for plaintiff affirmed.· 
[1] See 22 Cal.Jur. 944; 46 Am.Jur. 463. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Sales, § 108; [2] Sales, § 107; [3] 
Sales, § 84; [ 4] Sales, § 98 (1). 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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Bloom & Bloom and Eleanor V. Jackson for Appellants. 
Barry Sullivan for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-The trial court found that on December 17, 
1947, defendants, L. A. Wrecking Company, a partnership, 
and the partners, the owners of a house situated on a lot in 
Los Angeles, entered into an agreement to sell the house to 
plaintiff and move it to Bandini, California, for a total sum 
not exceeding $6,500 delivered. A $500 deposit or down 
payment was made and thereafter on April 2, 1948, a second 
deposit of $3,000 was made and accepted while the house was 
still at its original location. The balance of $3,000 was to 
be paid when the house was placed on the foundation at the 
new location. Defendants employed the M & M House 
Moving Company to move the building, which it did on May 
3, 1948, and placed it on "sills and blocks," the property 
of the mover, at the new location. It was to be lowered to 
the foundation by the mover. For the purpose of moving, 
a ''top portion'' of the top of the building had to be removed. 
On May 10, 1948, seven days after the moving, the house 
was destroyed by fire. At that time the portion of the roof 
had not been replaced, defendants had placed tarpaulins on 
the house to protect it, tools and equipment for replacing 
the roof were in the house, materials for the job were present 
at the new location and the house had not been placed upon 
the foundation. The court concluded that at the time of 
the fire, defendants had possession and control of the building 
and plaintiff should recover $3,587.50-the amount deposited 
plus sales tax-from defendants and the latter take nothing 
on its cross-complaint. 
Defendants contend that title to the house had passed 
to plaintiff when it was placed on the blocks and sills, and 
therefore the risk of loss was upon plaintiff at the time of 
the fire. 
The applicable legal principles are conceded by the parties. 
[1] With certain exceptions not here pertinent, the risk of 
loss falls upon the seller if title has not passed, and on the 
buyer, if it has. (Civ. Code, § 1742.) "(1) Where there 
is a contract to sell specific or ascertained goods, the property 
in them is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties 
to the contract intend it to be transferred. (2) For the pur-
pose of ascertaining the intention of the parties, regard shall 
be had to the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties, 
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usages of trade and the circumstances of the case.'' ( Civ. 
Code, § 1738.) "Unless a different intention appears, the 
following are rules for ascertaining the intention of the 
parties as to the time at which the property in the goods is 
to pass to the buyer .... Rule 5. If the contract to sell 
requires the seller to deliver the goods to the buyer, or at a 
particular place, or to pay the freight or cost of transporta-
tion to the buyer, or to a particular place, the property does 
not pass until the goods have been delivered to the buyer or 
reached the place agreed upon." ( Civ. Code, § 1739.) It 
remains therefore to ascertain whether the evidence was 
sufficient to support the conclusion that the risk of loss rested 
with defendants-sellers. 
The contract was dated December 17, 1947, drawn under 
the letterhead of defendants, and recited that $500 had been 
paid by plaintiff to defendants as a deposit on the house at 
a specified location "which is to be moved to approximately 
S.E. Cor. of Couts and Panocha Streets, Bandini, Califor-
nia." "Full price of" house-$3,500-less $500 deposit to 
be paid by plaintiff when application to move has been ap-
proved by Los Angeles. The "sale (is) subject to approval 
of buyer to the additional cost of moving.'' The total price 
is not to exceed '' $6,500.00 delivered.'' Defendants have the 
right to cancel the contract under specified contingencies by 
refunding all money received. On April 2, 1948, plaintiff 
had made arrangements for payments under the contract to 
be made by Atlantic Savings and Loan Association, with 
whom he had arranged for a loan. On that day in the pres-
ence of plaintiff and Chain, one of the defendants-part-
ners-a notation was made in handwriting on the contract 
by Dinoto, a representative of Atlantic, that "4/2/48, I, John 
Capitain, [plaintiff] hereby authorize the Atlantic Savings 
and Loan Association, to pay to L. A. Wrecking Co. [defend-
ants] balance due on the contract when building is [placed] 
on the foundation. Signed : John Capitain. '' The notation 
was made ensuing a conversation between plaintiff and Chain 
as to when the balance of $3,000 would be paid, and plaintiff 
had said he would pay when the house was on the foundation 
and, according to plaintiff's testimony, the wording of it was 
dictated by Chain. Another notation placed on the contract 
at the same time by Chain reads: "Received $3087.50 as a 
further deposit, balance due $3000." In other conversations 
defendants agreed to replace the portion of the roof and some 
bay windows which were removed in the process of moving; 
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that the house was to be placed on the ground at a point 
designated by plaintiff; that ''after the foundation was made 
the defendants were to lower this house down onto the founda-
tion, secure it to the foundation''; and that defendants told 
plaintiff the house was fully covered by insurance until de-
livered and all work finished. In the agreement between 
defendants and the mover, for moving the house, the mover 
agreed to lower it onto the foundation. 
[2] Defendants do not dispute, and it is clear from the 
contract, that it was one for the sale of property which was 
to be delivered to a certain place by the sellers-defendants-
and thus rule 5 of section 1739 of the Civil Code, quoted 
supra, applies. The only question remaining is when the 
delivery to the place was consummated. It is true the 
contract in the first part mentions delivery to the lot alone. 
There are, however, other factors and circumstances which 
would justify an inference that the delivery would not be 
complete, and therefore, title would not pass, until the house 
was lowered onto the foundation and the roof restored. There 
is the first notation made thereon on April 2, 1948, at de-
fendants' dictation, that the $3,000 balance is to be paid 
when the house is lowered onto the foundation, indicating 
that the delivery by the sellers was not to be completed until 
the building was on the foundation. The plaintiff was pur-
chasing a whole house as a unit, not in parts, hence it may 
be said that the house was not delivered until the roof, which 
had been removed, had been restored, and thus a complete 
house delivered. The house was setting on blocks which 
belonged to the mover. It is true that it was plaintiff's 
obligation to build the foundation, and he had not done so 
when the fire occurred, but there was no time fixed for the 
construction of the foundation, and only seven days, not an 
unreasonable time, had elapsed since the house was placed 
on the blocks. There had been a long delay on defendants' 
part in moving the house. Defendants had lumber and equip-
ment on the property to be used in replacing the roof, and 
some work had been done in that respect. Considering all 
of the circumstances it may be inferred that title did not pass 
before the fire. 
[3] Defendants refer to evidence that plaintiff, in arrang-
ing for a loan with Atlantic Savings and Loan Association, 
agreed with the latter to insure the house. That is not con-
trolling, as the contract gave plaintiff an insurable interest, 
and he had a right to protect the lender regardless of where 
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title was. It is not conclusive that plaintiff understood or 
intended title to pass. Moreover, defendants repeatedly as-
sured plaintiff that they were fully covered by insurance, 
with respect to the house, even while it was on the blocks. 
[4] The same comment is applicable to the assertion that the 
full price of the house-$3,500-was paid before it was moved. 
That might indicate that title was to pass then but it is not 
conclusive. There was still a balance of $3,000 which, while 
it might be allocated to the moving expense, was still a part 
of the $6,500 which was to be the maximum amount plaintiff 
agreed in the contract to pay. 
Judgment affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J·., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied August 2 .. 
1951. 
[S. F. No. 17997. In Bank. July 6, 1951.] 
ANNA BLACHE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MAURICE J. 
BLACHE et al., Defendants and Appellants. 
[1] Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Evidence at Former 
Trial.-On a second trial of an action for separate mainte-
nance and a determination of property rights, it is prejudicial 
error to allow plaintiff, over objection, to rest her case princi-
pally on the transcript of her testimony in the first trial, where 
such testimony on its face appears to be evasive and self-
contradictory and is the sole basis for essential findings in 
plaintiff's favor. 
[2] Evidence-Hearsay-Evidence at Former Trial.-In the ab-
sence of an agreement by the attorneys, or by the parties if 
not represented by counsel, the use of evidence at a former 
trial may be permitted only if the witness' testimony in 
court cannot be produced. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1870(8).) 
[3] Appeal- Affirmance- E:ffect.-A purported and inadvertent 
affirmance of a nonexistent portion of a judgment has no effect. 
[2] See 10 Cal.Jur. 1175; 20 Am.Jur. 578. 
McK Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 1553; [2] Evi· 
deuce, § 273; [3] Appeal and Error, § 1387; [ 4] Appeal and Error, 
§ 1357. 
